A fear of punishment, in most cases, causes greater zeal than expectation of a reward.
Accustoming to a punishment reduces sensitivity to stimulation in much smaller degree than accustoming to a reward.
Expenses of manager for punishment realization, in most cases, are less than expenses for a reward.
Therefore, - other things being equal - the infliction stimulation, as a rule, is more effectively than incentive one.
Besides, the infliction stimulation causes pleasant emotion of malice and feeling of the power over a worker at a manager.
Therefore, a manager, as a rule, prefers the infliction stimulation to the incentive one.
If control over actions of a worker is problematic, a manager can indirectly supervise his zeal by results of PP. The control by intermediate results is more effective than the control by the final result of PP as allows to provide the greatest zeal during all PP.
A worker's desire to work is named "the subjective factor".
Many factors which are not dependent on a worker's will, influence on PP. They are named "Objective Factors" (OF). For example, weather, climate, fertility, properties of technology etc.
A worker's health, force, psychics, abilities, skills, and qualification also are OF.
If all OF are favour to obtainment of the demanded results of PP, these results depend only on a worker's zeal.
Under this condition, a manager can estimate the zeal by results (intermediate and-or final) of PP and to stimulate a worker according to this estimation.
If any OF do not allow to obtain the demanded results of PP, they cannot be obtained independently of a worker's zeal and stimulation. Under this condition, the stimulation is useless and senseless.
If a worker worked intensively, but demanded results of PP are not obtained because of OF, and the manager nevertheless has punished the worker, the worker understands that the intensive labor does not provide absence of punishment.
Therefore henceforth, the worker's repudiation of a work, flight of a place of work, and even retaliatory endamagement to the manager and to his property are probable.
To prevent such conflict situation, the manager has to supervise all OF essentially influencing on PP.
If the manager cannot supervise all OF, he cannot indirectly supervise a worker's zeal by results of PP with the sufficient reliability.
Under this condition, erroneous estimation of the zeal is possible, and the risk of conflict to the worker is.
To exclude this risk, the manager is compelled to refuse application of more effective infliction stimulation and to apply less effective, but conflict-free incentive one.
Thus, if the manager cannot supervise action of the worker and all OF, he is compelled to refuse from infliction stimulations and to apply incentive one.
Under condition of long-term action of uncontrollable constant OF, a multiple performance of identical work allows the manager to supervise indirectly OF.
For example, he ascertains if the worker has necessary qualification. Therefore, at the subsequent performances of work of the same kind, the manager can pass from incentive stimulation to infliction one.
A worker, as a rule, expects such possibility.
Therefore, in such situation, as a rule, he simulates harmful influence of OF, for example, the inability and impossibility of satisfactory performance of the task.
To avoid passive sabotage, the manager has to guarantee the worker against punishments in the future.
The Conclusion. If a worker can simulate harmful influence of OF, a manager is compelled to guarantee a worker against punishments.
If carried out work is similar to works which were carried out earlier repeatedly, a manager knows average time and the quality parameters with which an average worker can perform similar work.
He also knows cost of workers of the necessary qualification. On this basis, he knows for what incentive an average worker will agree to perform this work.
If the work is original, that is, similar works were not carried out earlier, statistical knowledge on its performance is absent. The manager cannot know the time and parameters of quality of performance of the work with sufficient probability. Also he does not know size of incentive for which an average worker will agree to perform this work.
The worker, as a rule, knows about these circumstances. Therefore, at a conclusion of employment agreement, he can establish raised time and understated parameters of quality of performance of the work and to demand the payment which is much more than objective cost of labor expenditures. The work performance on such conditions considerably reduces useful result for the manager, for example, profit.
The Conclusion. If the work is original, the stimulation of a worker, as a rule, ineffectively.
If a manager cannot establish if the work executed or not, the stimulation of a worker is, in principle, inefficiently and almost senselessly.
The Sociogenesis Diagram